The Week That Was: Money, Money, Money
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The Week That Was

The Week That Was: Money, Money, Money

There are certain days throughout the year that attract a level of attention that extends well beyond the significance of the event itself, not because anything materially changes overnight, but because they provide a convenient focal point around which politicians, economists, industry groups, commentators and market participants can gather their assumptions, concerns and predictions and project them forward as though a single day on the calendar has somehow determined the future direction of an entire state.

For Queensland, that day is 24 June.

Not Budget Day itself, but the day after.

The day when the Treasurer's speech has been delivered, the headlines have been written, the winners and losers have been declared, and everyone suddenly becomes an expert in finance, infrastructure prioritisation, debt management, productivity and economic forecasting.

By mid-morning at the latest, industry groups will be warning that critical projects have been overlooked.

Economists will be debating whether debt levels remain sustainable and the Opposition will be questioning whether the Government has mortgaged the future.

The Government will be defending the necessity of investment and contractors will be searching for certainty in the pipeline.

And somewhere in the middle of it all will sit a discussion that has become increasingly difficult to avoid — and that's Queensland's balance sheet.

While much of the public debate surrounding infrastructure focuses on projects, announcements and commitments, the reality is that the State is now entering a period where the conversation is not what needs to be delivered but what can actually be afforded. It is this clear distinction that matters for all of us.

Queensland has never had a shortage of infrastructure needs as population growth continues to exceed expectations.

The health system is expanding, albeit slowly, and at enormous expense. Noting that it's been over 20 months since the last main works contract was agreed and no contracts at all have been entered into since the Hospital Rescue Plan came out — projects proceeding are all early works packages, with some in the many hundreds of millions. How is the structure of a hospital an early works package I hear you asking?

Water security remains a growing challenge, the energy transition continues to require substantial capital investment, and Corrective Services infrastructure is facing increasing capacity pressures as offender numbers grow and facilities age.

Sitting over the top of all of it is the fast-becoming-ridiculous Brisbane 2032 Olympic and Paralympic Games, bringing with it not only venue delivery obligations but broader expectations around transport, housing, urban renewal and legacy infrastructure that will shape the State for decades.

The challenge is not identifying projects that are required, but that every one of those priorities is competing for funding from the same balance sheet.

For years the Treasurer has benefited from a relatively straightforward growth equation — more people generating more economic activity and more economic activity generating more revenue, supporting additional infrastructure investment.

The model was not perfect, but it was broadly sustainable.

Today, however, the equation is becoming increasingly complex because the cost of supporting growth is escalating faster than the capacity of government revenue to comfortably absorb it. Everything infrastructure costs more, and at the same time, productivity improvements capable of offsetting those increases have remained elusive.

This is where the discussion around reconciling ambition becomes particularly important.

Because while the term sounds relatively harmless, it is often one of the clearest indicators that governments are attempting something. Today it is increasingly becoming a balance sheet management tool.

Not because governments no longer want to deliver infrastructure, but because they are confronting the practical reality that attempting to deliver everything, everywhere, all at once carries consequences that extend well beyond the project itself.

One of those consequences is Queensland's credit rating.

The prospect of losing the State's Triple-A credit rating has increasingly entered infrastructure conversations, not because credit ratings themselves build hospitals or deliver transport projects, but because they influence the cost of borrowing required to fund them.

A Triple-A rating is ultimately a measure of confidence.

Confidence in the State's financial management. Confidence in its ability to service debt. Confidence in the sustainability of its long-term fiscal position.

Lose that confidence and the cost of borrowing rises. When the cost of borrowing rises, the cost of infrastructure rises. When the cost of infrastructure rises, the capacity to deliver infrastructure falls.

The implications are neither immediate nor catastrophic. States do not suddenly stop functioning because a rating changes. Projects do not instantly disappear. Markets do not collapse.

But the cumulative impact over time becomes significant, particularly for a jurisdiction facing decades of infrastructure investment requirements.

This is why the Budget may ultimately reveal more through what it chooses to do than through what it chooses not to.